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INCOME TAX CONCESSIONS AND INVESTMENTS 
IN SOIL CONSERVATION PRACTICES
by
Nelson L. Bills*
Soil erosion on cropland is a perennial public policy issue in 
the United States because some cropland erodes at rates that appear to 
jeopardize long-term soil productivity and/or generate important off­
site damages. These conditions persist despite a half-century of 
public policies and programs designed to induce farmland owners to 
voluntarily take measures to ameliorate soil loss problems on the 
Nation’s agricultural land. The inducements employed take three 
general forms: (1) educational programs and technical assistance
delivered to landowners through local soil and water conservation 
districts, (2) direct cash subsidy, usually via a cost-sharing payment 
to a landowner who is willing to install a soil conservation practice, 
and (3) tax concessions for certain soil and water conservation proj­
ects under the Federal Internal Revenue Service Code.
The centerpiece of Federal income tax policy for soil and water 
conservation is a 1954 amendment (Sec® 175) which allows a taxpayer 
with farm income to treat a conservation-related land improvement as 
an ordinary business expense. Deducting the expenditure reduces net 
farm Income and produces tax savings for the current tax year. Prior 
to this change, soil and water conservation expenditures had been 
treated as a nondepreciable capital improvement. A nondepreciable 
capital item increases the basis for calculating capital gain and pro­
duces a tax saving when the property is liquidated. It has been shown 
that the tax saving from the deduction is superior to the saving via 
capital gain (Boxley and Anderson; Collins),
Popular opinion is that deducting a conservation outlay as an 
ordinary business expense under Sec. 175 tends to make the Internal 
Revenue Code pro-conservation. That is, the expensing option creates 
an economic incentive to undertake soil conservation practices on the 
Nation’s farmland. However, two factors weigh against such opinions. 
The first traces to confusion over definitions. The Internal Revenue 
Code treats conservation expense generically. Deductible expenses to 
improve land under Sec. 175 include commonly accepted erosion control 
practices but also encompass expenditures needed to improve drainage, 
eradicate brush, or provide supplemental irrigation water. Such land 
improvements often set the stage for more intensive crop production. 
More intensive production can lead to more, rather than less, soil 
erosion. On the other hand, Sec. 175 is by definition limited to
*Associate professor, Department of Agricultural Economics, Cornell 
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2erosion control expenditures which involve improvements to land. In 
contrast, many widely accepted techniques for erosion control— such as 
cover crops, conservation tillage, strip-cropping and contour 
farming— do not require expenditures to improve land. Landowners who 
employ these measures do not explicitly receive differential treatment 
when computing their income tax liability.
Second, the conservation incentive argument is based on a simple 
comparison of the option to deduct rather than capitalize the cost of 
improving land for conservation purposes. This narrow context for 
evaluating conservation management decisions lacks precision because 
it ignores broad classes of on-farm expenditures which are depreciable 
under the Code. Investments in depreciable capital items may be 
equally, or even more, advantageous from an income tax point of view.
A necessary condition for tax-induced conservation investment under 
Sec. 175 is that the owner-investor cannot generate greater tax sav­
ings with a depreciable expenditure. Depreciable expenditures Include 
a few we11-recognized erosion control measures such as implements 
needed to practice reduced or no-tillage, but extend to a variety of 
productivity-increasing land improvements. Examples are installation 
of field drainage tile, fencing, and construction of structures for 
feed, livestock, or machinery storage.
Both definitional problems and the tax advantages available to 
those who make expenditures which are capitalized, deducted, or 
depreciated are addressed in this report. Practices eligible for a 
conservation deduction are discussed and compared with conservation 
treatment needs and the land treatment measures actually used by 
landowners to control soil erosion, as reported in the USDA's 1982 
National Resource Inventory. Then, Code provisions for depreciable 
and nondepreciable improvements to land are described and analyzed 
within the framework of a simple investment model for the farm firm. 
This approach allows Internally consistent comparisons of the tax 
treatment afforded all land improvements. Calculations derived from 
this model shed new light on tax incentives for conservation-related 
land improvements under current tax law. A concluding section of the 
report outlines the study?s implications for public soil erosion 
policy.
Soil Erosion and Erosion Control 
on U.S. Cropland
Soil erosion from rainfall or wind is predicated upon physical 
features of land used for crop production but also depends upon crop 
rotations, tillage operations, and conservation support practices 
selected by the farm operator. These management practices, in par­
ticular overt efforts to reduce soil loss through reduced tillage or 
conservation support practices, are the point of departure for an 
analysis of tax provisions for soil and water conservation expendi­
tures and erosion control.
3Erosion Control Practices and 
Deductible Conservation Expenses
The USDA collected comprehensive information on soil loss for 
cropland in the 1982 National Resource Inventory (NRI). The inventory 
shows that 36 percent of U,S. cropland is treated with one or more 
practices which reduce erosion due to rainfall or wind (table 1). The 
predominant practice is conservation tillage, a cultural practice in­
volving reduced or no tillage and utilization of crop residues to 
reduce erosion. When combinations with other practices are taken into 
account, 24 percent of all cropland— about 100 million acres— has the 
benefit of this practice. Roughly two-thirds of all treated acreage 
involves the use of conservation tillage. Terracing— a land improve­
ment which reduces rainfall erosion by reducing slope length-— is used 
on about 7 percent of the Nation's cropland. Other practices, such as 
contour farming and diversions, can materially reduce soil loss but 
are used on only a small fraction of the total cropland base.
Table 1— Status of conservation treatment for wind, sheet, and rill 
erosion on U.S. cropland, 1982
Conservation
practice Acres (1,000) Percent
None 269,135.3 63.9
Contour farming 8,771.0 2.1
Diversions 1,066.9 0.3
Windbreaks 3,359.7 0.8
Grade stabilization 1,168.0 0.3
Grassed waterway 7,136.8 1.7
Contour stripcropping 1,810.7 0.4
Wind stripcropping 6,877.7 1.6
Terrace 3,450.7 0.8
Conservation tillage 76,036.6 18.0
Combinations of practices: 
Terrace/conservation tillage 11,799.0 2.8
Terrace/other 13,483.7 3.2
Conservation tillage/other 11,798.3 2.8
All other 5,471.8 1.3
Total 421,366.2 100.0
Source: Unpublished data from the 1982 National Resource Inventory.
The control measures currently used by farmers to curb soil loss 
on cropland contrast sharply with the land management practices which 
fall under the purview of Sec. 175 of the IRS Code. For tax purposes, 
a far wider range of land improvements are treated as a deductible
4soil and water conservation expense, but only a few are necessarily 
related to erosion control (table 2). Aside from windbreaks (tree 
plantings to reduce wind erosion), the Code focuses only on soil 
erosion measures which alter cropland topography by reducing slope 
length (diversions and terraces) or control gullying in areas with 
concentrated overland flow (grassed waterways). Code Sec® 175 other­
wise focuses on land improvements oriented toward waste treatment, 
drainage works, irrigation improvements, and brush control.
Table 2-— Deductible soil and water conservation expenditures by type 
of conservation improvement
Deductible expenditure
Erosion
Yes
control measure 
No
Leveling and grading X
Soil conditioning X
Terracing X
Restoration of fertility X
Diversion channels X
Drainage ditches X
Irrigation ditches X
Earthen dams X
Watercourses and outlets X
Ponds X
Eradication of brush X
Windbreaks
Assessments for improvements made by
X
conservation or drainage districts X
Sources Adapted from U.S. Department of the Treasury, 1984.
While all of these land improvements fall within the general 
rubric of soil and water conservation, it is clear that Code provi­
sions for a conservation deduction cannot be used interchangeably with 
expenditures to control soil erosion® At present, less than 10 per­
cent of all U.S. cropland is treated with measures (terraces, diver­
sions, grassed waterways, and windbreaks) which fall under Sec, 175 of 
the Code because they entail enduring capital improvements to land. 
Under current technology, efforts to control soil erosion do not 
principally involve investments in land improvements, Conservation 
tillage, now used on nearly a quarter of the Nation’s cropland, 
involves adjustments in machinery complements on farms, changes in 
production inputs, and different timing for field tillage operations. 
Similarly, a number of more traditional erosion control practices—  
such as contour farming— entail adjustments in crop production prac­
tices but do not generally require permanent improvements to the land.
5Erosion Treatment Needs
The importance of improving land for erosion control purposes in 
the future will depend on the vulnerability of the cropland base to 
soil loss in crop production and the cost effectiveness of alternate 
erosion control practices. To gain perspective on these conditions, 
data on erosion treatment needs were summarized from the 1982 NRI,
This information was combined with a classification of land based on 
its physical erosion potential (Bills and Heimlich). In reference to 
a 5 ton per acre per year (TAY) soil loss tolerance, nearly 40 percent 
of the U.S. cropland base is nonerodible (table 3). This land can be 
used at varying intensity in crop production without appreciable loss 
of productivity or off-site damage due to rainfall erosion. Nonerodi­
ble cropland, by definition, does not require additional treatment to 
control rainfall erosion.
Table 3— Status of erosion control treatment on U.S. cropland, 1982
Erosion treatment needed
Erosion potential Total Yes No
Moderately erosive:
Managed below tolerance 164,872.1
Acres
59,041.8 105,830.3
Managed above tolerance 60,930.4 57,399.6 3,530.8
Highly erosive 29,858.1 29,561.6 296.5
Nonerosive 165,705.6 -— 165,705.6
Total 421,366.2 146,003.0 275,363.2
Moderately erosive:
Managed below tolerance 39.1
Percent
14.0 25.1
Managed above tolerance 14.5 13.6 0.9
Highly erosive 7.1 7.0 0.1
Nonerosive 39.3 39.3
Total 100.0 34.6 65.4
—  = Not applicable.
Source: 1982 National Resource Inventory,
Nearly 55 percent of all cropland has the requisite physical 
properties to erode above or below a 5 TAY tolerance, depending on the 
management applied by farm operators. This land is rated moderately 
erosive. According to on-site assessments by SCS technicians, the 
1982 NRI indicates that about half (109.4 million acres) of this land 
now receives adequate erosion control treatment while 116,4 million 
acres requires further treatment (table 3). However, almost three- 
fourths of this moderately erodible land is currently managed within a 
5 TAY soil loss tolerance.
6At the other extremes, 7 percent of all cropland is highly credi­
ble. Virtually all of this highly erodible cropland requires treat­
ment for erosion control. This land cannot be managed to erode below 
a 5 TAY tolerance except under the most restricted farming methods 
(such as permanent vegetative cover).
Investment in Land Improvements 
Under Alternate Tax Rules
One can hypothesize that some decisions to improve farmland* for 
conservation purposes or for other reasons, are tax-induced. However, 
it is difficult to assemble the evidence needed to determine just how 
influential expected tax liabilities are in the investment decision 
(Sisson). Proving that a certain investment has advantageous tax 
treatment hardly proves that the investor will decide to undertake 
it. The test that can be done is accumulate circumstantial evidence 
showing the ramifications of a tax rule for an investment's economic 
feasibility.
Such evidence was developed in this study, based on calculations 
derived from a simple investment model. The model mirrors the eco­
nomic considerations thought to be involved with an on-farm invest­
ment. When altered to reflect provisions of the Internal Revenue 
Code, it provides information on the impact tax rules have on the 
economic feasibility of a capital expenditure to improve land for 
farming purposes.
Alternate Tax Rules
As a point of departure, the Code was reviewed to determine the 
options available for computing tax liabilities incurred when improv­
ing farmland. For this purpose, a distinction must be made between 
depreciable and nondepreciable land improvements. Nondepreciable 
improvements are those defined as a soil and water conservation 
expense— see table 2, These outlays can be capitalized (added to the 
basis for calculating capital gain or loss when the land is liqui­
dated) or deducted as an ordinary business expense. Public subsidy in 
the form of cost sharing is sometimes available for such improvements; 
for some public subsidy programs, the investor can elect to exclude 
the cost-share amount from calculations of taxable income.
This treatment of a conservation investment contrasts sharply 
with that afforded a land improvement defined as depreciable under the 
Code. A land improvement is depreciable if it (1) is used in the farm 
business, (2) has a determinant useful life of more than one year, and 
(3) is subject to wear, obsolescence, or a loss in value from natural 
causes (U.S. Dept, of the Treasury, 1984). The investor can recover 
the costs of such improvements under the Accelerated Cost Recovery 
System (ACRS). Alternatively, the item can be depreciated over a 5-, 
12-, or 25-year span. Within dollar limits, an election can be made
7to deduct (expense) the cost of a depreciable asset, rather than 
recover its cost via ACRS or alternate ACRS. Finally, broad classes 
of depreciable land improvements are also eligible for an investment 
tax credit*
Some tax options can be used in combinations. Thus, the farm 
investor who contemplates a farmland improvement has a somewhat 
bewildering array of 31 tax avenues available for consideration (table 
4). Six have to do with soil and water conservation outlays which are 
nondepreciable and fall under Sec. 175 of the Code; four of these are 
contingent upon the availability of a public cost-share subsidy. The 
remaining 25 options relate to depreciable capital items. Most depre­
ciable improvements to farmland fall under Sec, 1245 of the IRS Code 
and qualify as five-year property for cost recovery purposes (Casler 
and Smith). Examples of such land improvements are single purpose 
livestock and horticultural structures, silos, grain storage bins, 
fences, paved barnyards, water wells and drainage tiles.^ Such 
property is subject to cost recovery under the Accelerated Cost Recov­
ery System (ACRS) or straight-line depreciation— referred to as Alter­
nate ACRS. The investor has the option of depreciating over 5, 12 or 
25 years. Regardless of the cost recovery method selected, the 
investor can obtain an 8 or 10 percent investment credit on these 
depreciable expenditures to improve land.
Within dollar limits, the investor can make an election to treat 
an outlay for a depreciable capital item as an ordinary business 
expense (Sec. 179). Investment tax credit is not allowed when an out­
lay for a depreciable capital item is treated as an ordinary business 
expense. Finally, options for depreciable capital items can be com­
bined in any given tax year, but the combinations are limited under 
current law. Investors must use the same method and recovery period 
for all property in the same cost recovery class. However, one can 
combine a selected method and recovery period with an election to 
expense under Sec. 179 (table 4).
An Investment Model
The implications of tax liabilities accruing under each tax 
option can be illustrated by incorporating them into a simple 
investment model for the farm firm. Consider first the rule that 
might be applied to a landowner's decision to undertake an investment 
in a land improvement in the absence of an income tax liability 
(Boxley and Anderson):
1 All farm machinery and equipment, except light trucks, is also 
five-year property under Sec. 1245 (U.S, Dept, of the Treasury, 
1984).
8Table 4— Land improvements: Tax options available to sole proprietors
with farm income
Investment
_____Cost-sharing credit (IC)
Type of None Declared Excluded^ None 10% 8%
improvement as income from income
Nondepreciable
Capitalize X X  X
Expense^ X X  X
Depreciable
Cost recovery
ACRS
Alternate ACRS
X X X
5 years X X X
12 years X X X
25 years X X X
First year election
to expense^ X
Cost recovery and 
first year election 
to expense
Alternate ACRS
5 years X X X
12 years X X X
25 years X X X
1 Federal or state programs must be certified by the Secretary of 
Agriculture to be eligible. Certified Federal programs include the 
rural clean water program and certain programs falling under the (1) 
Surface Mining and Control Act of 1977, (2) Water Bank Act, (3) 
Agricultural Credit Act of 1978, (4) Soil Conservation and Domestic 
Allotment Act, (5) Cooperative Forestry Assistance Act of 1978, and 
(6) Watershed Protection and Flood Protection Act.
2 Expensing of a soil and water conservation project is limited to 25 
percent of gross farm income during the tax year; unused deductions 
can be carried over to succeeding tax years.
3 Deduction cannot exceed $5,000 for the 1984-87 tax years. The limit 
increases to $7,500 in 1988 and 1989, and to $10,000 for 1990 and 
thereafter.
Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of the Treasury, 1984.
9k Eo <Yt> Eo (Mk )
I < V0 = X  ------- + .......  (I)
t-1 (l+i)t (l+i)k
whe re: I «
V0 = 
E0(Yt) "
E0(Mk) =
i = 
t -
k -
the investment cost;
the value of the investment to the landowner at 
toi
the expected net income to be generated by the 
investment in t;
the expected salvage value of the improvement at 
the end of year k;
the opportunity cost of the landowner's capital; 
unit of time (year);
the number of years the investment is held.
The decision rule in (1) makes a land improvement attractive from 
an economic point of view if the present value of the returns expected 
from the outlay are greater than the expense incurred when the im­
provement is made; both annual accruals of income and the expected 
salvage value of the improvement are taken into account.
Federal income tax liabilities are easily introduced into the 
mode 1:
k Eq (Yt) (1-Tr) E0 (Mk ) - Tc [E0 (Mk )]
I < V0 » 1  ---- ---------  + ------- -- — ----------  (2)
t=l (l+i)t (l+i)k
where; Tr = a marginal tax rate on annual income;
Tc = the marginal tax rate on capital gains.
Here a tax is levied on income expected to be generated by the 
land improvement on a yearly basis. The reduction in income is a 
function of the tax rate (Tr); income remaining after taxes is 1-Tr. 
Changes stemming from gains (or losses) in the capital value of an 
asset— the second component of (1) above— are also taxed. Any gain on 
the capital value of the investment (Mp) is subject to tax at the 
effective tax rate, Tc, Under the current law, 40 percent of the gain 
on an asset held more than six months must be declared as ordinary 
income at the marginal rate (Tr).
Conservation Improvements: To fashion contrasts between a conserva­
tion outlay and other kinds of land improvements, consider the effect 
of capitalizing a conservation expenditure on the investment decision 
rule:
10
k E0 (Yt) (1-Tr) E0 (Mk ) - Tc [E0 (Mk ) - I]
I < V 0 = X  --------------------------- + ------------------------------ ---------------------- ( 3 )
t-1 (l+l)t (l+i)k
Adding a conservation expenditure (I) to the basis for capital gains 
sets the stage for a tax reduction when the land is liquidated. If E0 
(Mj,) y_ I, i.e., the conservation improvement does not depreciate, 
taxes on gain are reduced by Tc (I); the present value of the tax 
reduction is Tc (I)/(l+i)k.
This treatment under the law can be contrasted with the option of 
deducting the conservation outlay during the tax year (Code Sec.
175). If recapture is ignored, the decision then becomes:
k Ec (Yt) (1-Tr)
I < V0 = I ---_ _ _ _ _ _  + Tr (I) +
t=l (l+i)t
w
^o ) - Tc [E0 (Mk^J
(1+i )k
The effect of the deduction, compared with capitalization, on tax 
liabilities is twofold. First, the deduction produces an immediate 
tax benefit— Tr (I). Second, tax savings generated by an increase in 
the basis for calculating capital gain are forgone— see equation (3).
A 1969 amendment provides for recapture of all or a fraction of 
previously deducted conservation expense as ordinary income if the 
improved farmland is disposed of in nine or fewer years after it was 
acquired (Code Sec. 1252).^ The decision rule is modified 
accordingly:
k E0 (Yt) (1-Tr)
I £  v0 = I ---- --- ----- + Tr (I) +
t=l (l+i)t
E0 (Mk ) - | T C [E0 (Mk)] + Tr [RCk ]}
(1+i)k
where RC^ = recapture of conservation expense in year k.
2 If the land is held for 5 years or less, the recapture percentage 
is 100; recapture declines in 20 percent increments for years 6-9 
and is zero thereafter.
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The recapture provision reduces the taxes saved by the conserva­
tion deduction, but the impact of the law's recapture provision is 
dampened by the discount rate except in the unlikely case where land 
is improved and liquidated during the same tax year.
Some landowners undertake conservation projects with public cost 
sharing assistance. If the public subsidy is declared as income and 
the expenditure is capitalized, the decision rule becomes:
k E0 (Yt) (1-Tr)
I < V0 = I — - + (1-Tr) (S) (I) + 
t=l (l+i)1-
Eo «k -{Tc !Eo Mk " 1 U-S)]l
(l+i)k
where S - Federal cost share (0 < S < 1.0).
With cost sharing, profitability of the investment increases 
because (1—Tr) (S) (I) is available to offset the outlay after taxes. 
An offsetting effect is that only the owner's share of the project 
expense can be used to adjust the basis for calculating gain at the 
time of liquidation.
If the conservation project is expensed with cost-sharing assist 
ance, the rule is:
k Eq (Yt) (1-Tr)
I < V0 s 1  - --------- ---  + Tr (1-S) I + (1-Tr) (S) (I) +
t^l (l+i)t
( 7 )
Eo Mk - (Tc [E0 (Mk )] + Tr [RCk ]}
-L [_• , . r - , .  —  T  — I —  , — _  ■ .1, n Ti   «
(l+i)k
A 1978 Code amendment (Code Sec. 126) gives landowners the option 
of receiving cost sharing but making a one-time election to exclude 
these funds from calculations of taxable income. Further, no adjust­
ment to the basis of the property is to be made. If the property 
improved with such payments is disposed of within 20 years, all or a
12
portion of the payments are recaptured as ordinary income during the 
year of disposition (Code Sec. 1255),^
The decision rule, with a conservation project capitalized but 
with a Federal cost share excluded from income, becomes:
k E0 (Yt) (l~Tr)
I < V0 = £  -------------- + S (I) +
t=l (l+i)t
( 8 )
Eo (Mk - (t c [E0 (Mk ) - I] + T r [RCSk ]}
(l+i)k
where RCS^ = recapture of excluded Federal cost share in year k. 
If the project is expensed: 
k E0 <Yt) (1-Tr)
! < V0 = 2 ________ ______+ Tr (1-S) I + S (I) +
t=l (l+i)t
(9)
Eo Mk - [t c [E0 (Mk ) - I] + Tr [RCr + RCSk ]}
■■i— i - m — i n r -m  ift to m. , M u H. CT t n . .  „■ ,  i a., * ,m n i.T ,i i > , ^ n ..  ip.^.i^i « >1 «
(l+i)k
Depreciable Land Improvements: Tax treatment accorded depreciable
land improvements was substantially modified by the 1981 Economic 
Recovery Tax Act, This legislation makes farmland improvements eligi­
ble for accelerated cost recovery (ACRS). Under ACRS, depreciable 
assets are placed into one of four cost recovery classes, regardless 
of the expected useful life of the asset to the farm business (Code 
Sec. 168). Any expected salvage value of the asset is ignored in the 
cost recovery calculations; all cost recovery under ACRS or an alter­
nate straight-line depreciation method is taxable as ordinary income 
in the year of disposition. Under ACRS, the decision rule is:
3 A 100 percent recapture rate applies if disposition occurs within 
the first 10 years, with an annual decrease of 10 percent 
thereafter.
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k Eq (Yt) (1—Tr) a Tr (CRa)
1 £  vo = S  . — ------- — ---- + 1  ------- - +
t=l ( t=l (1+i)a
E0 (Mk) “ fTc tEo <Mk>] + Tr [ I  CRal]
t-1
(l+i)k
where CRa = cost recovery in year a.
(10)
Finally, one can elect to schedule straight-line depreciation for an 
eligible land improvement. When depreciated, the decision rule is:
1 < v0 = I
k E0 (Yt) (1-Tr) a Tr (Da) 
----------_  + £  - ------ +
t-1 (1+i)1 t=l (1+i)'
( 11)
a
E0 (Mk ) ~(TC [E0 (Mk)] + Tr [ X Da ]
L t-1 J
(1+i )k
where D., = depreciation in year a,
Whether cost recovery or depreciation is taken on the acquired 
asset, the Code allows for an investment tax credit. The credit is 
subtracted directly from the investor’s tax liability; there are pro­
visions for carry-over of credits to succeeding tax years. One has 
the option of obtaining a 10 percent investment credit (C) and reduc­
ing the basis for cost recovery or depreciation by 5 percent.
If property is liquidated before the credit claimed is fully 
earned, a port ion is subject to recapture. If the property is dis­
posed of after one full year, the full credit amount is subject to 
recapture. The fraction recaptured is reduced by one-fifth for each 
full year increase in the holding period; recapture is zero if the 
property is held for five or more years.
If C = .1 and ACRS applies, then .95 (I) is available for cost 
recovery. If the land is held for the full recovery period or longer 
(k > 5), the decision rule is:
14
k Eo (Yt) (1-Tr) a Tr (.95CRa)
I < VQ = £  ---- --------- + 2 -----------  + C (I) +
t=l (1+i)* t-1 (1+i)a
Eo (Mk) - £ t c [Eq (Mk ) ] + Tr [
a
2
t-1
95CRa]}
(l+i)k
(12)
The provision for adjusting the basis can be circumvented with an 
election to take an 8 percent investment credit. If C = .08 (I) and 
ACRS applies, then the full outlay is available for cost recovery. If 
k > 5, then the decision rule becomes:
k E0 (Yt) (l“Tr) a Tr (CRa)
I < V G = s ------------+ £ ------- + c (I) +
t=l (lH-i)£ t=l (l+i)a
Eo (Mk ) - |t c [Eq (Mk )] + Tr
(13)
(l+i)k
Investment credit with straight-line depreciation has an identi­
cal effect on the decision rule. If C = .1, then .95 (I) is available 
for cost recovery. The decision rule is:
k Eq (Yt) (1-Tr) a Tr (.95Da)
i < v 0 = £ _ _ L ----- . + 2 — _____+cq> +
t-1 (l+i)* t-1 (l+i)a
E0 (Mk ) - |t c [E0(Hk )] + T r [ 2 .95Da ]{
t-1
(l+i)k
(14)
If C = .08 (I) and straight-line depreciation applies:
15
k E0 (Yt) (1-Tr) a Tr (Da)
I < V0 = X  _. .....—  + X  —  + C (I) +
t=l (l+i)t t=l (1+i)a
Eo (V  - (Tc [Eo (Mk)] + Tr 11|  Da]]
(15)
Finally, an investor can elect to treat the cost of a land im­
provement as an expense rather than a capital expenditure (Code Sec. 
179). Investment credit is not allowed on any portion of the cost 
which is expensed. All gain stemming from the liquidation of the 
asset is treated as ordinary income. The maximum deduction allowed is 
$5,000 for 1984-87, $7,500 for 1988-89, and $10,000 for 1990 and 
thereafter.
If an expenditure on a depreciable item is expensed, the decision 
rule becomes:
k Eq (Yt) (1-Tr) E0 (Mk) - Tr [E0 (Mk )]
I £ V 0 = X ----------- - --  + _ — — --— -------  . (16)
t=l (l+i)* (l+i)k
Impact of Tax Rules on Investment Feasibility
Unfortunately, the parameters needed to empirically validate the 
proposed model are not available. Reliable information about land­
owner's planning horizon, discount rate and expectations about future 
income, expenses, and terminal asset value is difficult to acquire.
The validation problem is particularly severe when conservation 
investments are involved because little information exists on rela­
tionships between reduced soil erosion and net income. However, it is 
informative to simulate the impact of each tax option on net income 
using consistent assumptions about investor behavior. This can be 
accomplished by calculating the present value of pretax net income 
required to just offset the cost incurred in improving land.
For the purposes of this study, the calculations were referenced 
to a $100 cash outlay and the present value of pretax income needed to 
"break even” on the improvement was expressed on an annualized basis. 
The effect of each tax option is to increase or decrease the pretax 
net income needed to make the improvement economically feasible. The 
model was solved for marginal tax rates applicable to married indi­
viduals who file a tax return jointly with their spouses; tax rates for 
this group range from 11 to 50 percent for the 1984 tax year. When 
applicable, a 50 percent cost-share rate on conservation improvements 
was incorporated into the analysis.
16
To illustrate, the present value of after-tax net income required 
to break even on a $100 expenditure in the context of equation (2) is:
k Eq (Yt) (1-Tr) E0 (Hk ) - Tc [E0 (Mk )]
I ---- ------- _  - 100 - _ _ _ _ _ — --- ----------
t=l (l+i)t (l+i)k
The annual equivalent of this income stream can be calculated as 
(Herfindahl and Kneese):
EQ (Yt) (1-Ir) (1+ (l+i)-k/i) .
Substituting and solving for E0(Yt):
100 - Eq (Mk) - Tc [Eq (Mk )]
E0 (Yt) — ----- — —  --------- 
— -----  = (l+i)k
1 - Tr ______________ ________
1 - (l+i)"k/i
This approach requires the assumption that the pretax net income 
increment E0(Yt) is received in level amounts at the end of each year 
in the planning period. Its value can be calculated for all marginal 
tax rates (Tr), To further simplify the analysis, it was assumed 
that the investor's marginal tax rate is constant during the holding 
period. Alternate tax rules can be sequentially introduced into the 
investment model, using EQ(Yt) as a point of reference for gauging the 
impact of the rule on the profitability of an incremental $100 invest­
ment in a land improvement.
Conservation Improvements: Results for a conservation improvement
under a 20-year planning horizon, a 10 percent discount rate, a 100 
percent salvage value, and a 50 percent cost-share rate are shown in 
table 5. As expected, capitalizing the improvement (see equation 3) 
requires the largest pretax net income to insure project feasibility. 
When capitalized, the improvement expense is added to the basis for 
computing gain income in the year the land is liquidated. Since it is 
assumed for purposes here that the improvement does not deteriorate 
in value (salvage value equals investment cost), the basis for calcu­
lating tax on capital gain is zero and tax on gain income is avoided; 
the annual income stream required to justify the outlay is only offset 
by the present value of the investment at liquidation.
Under these circumstances, the pretax income required to justify 
the outlay increases sharply as marginal tax rate increases. Taxes on
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gain are avoided and the improvement's salvage value receives the same 
discount penalty, regardless of income level# Thus, variation in pre­
tax income needed to justify (break even on) the outlay is due solely 
to the tax liability incurred on ordinary (current) income#
As mentioned previously, incentives to invest in a conservation 
improvement are altered by an election to expense rather than capital­
ize the outlay. Under assumptions used he re — 2 0—y ear holding period, 
10 percent discount rate, and 100 percent salvage value— the annual­
ized present value of break-even net income before taxes ranges from 
$9.87 to $8.95 per $100 expended (table 5). Furthermore, the effect 
of the deduction is perverse in the sense that high—income investors 
who utilize the deduction need less net income before taxes to break 
even than do investors in lower tax brackets• This holds because the 
deduction offsets tax liability for the current tax year and is more 
valuable to the high income investor; this benefit more than offsets 
the relatively higher tax liability incurred by the high income 
investor on gain income at liquidation (see equation 5). Tax liabili­
ties generated by gain income are heavily penalized by discounting, 
regardless of one*s taxable income.
Public subsidy in the form of cost sharing, as expected, has a 
dramatic effect on the feasibility of a conservation project, and any 
opportunities to exclude a cost-share increment from taxable income 
accentuate these effects. The interaction of discounting, alterations 
of the basis for calculation of capital gain, and reductions in cur­
rent tax liabilities produces a number of contrasts for high and low 
Income investors (table 5). Expensing and excluding a cost share from 
income has the most positive effect on project feasibility; these 
effects are nearly neutral to tax rate. However, cost sharing without 
exclusions from income tilts project feasibility toward investors with 
lower taxable income. At the maximum marginal rate, the benefits of a 
50 percent cost share are completely dissipated in present value terms 
when compared to expensing without public assistance#
Depreciable Improvements: To fashion contrasts between conservation
improvements and depreciable capital items, the model was solved 
for a set of tax rules involving ACRS, alternate 5-year (straight- 
line ) depreciation, elections to expense and investment credit (table 
6). Provisions for 12-year and 25-year depreciation were Ignored 
since, by definition, they would Increase the break-even net income 
required to justify the improvement. This holds because the deprecia­
tion allowance is released over a longer time frame and is more 
heavily penalized by discounting#
Model results clearly demonstrate the impact of accelerated 
depreciation and the availability of investment tax credits on project 
feasibility. Under accelerated cost recovery, annualized present 
value of pretax net income required to service a $100 outlay ranges 
from $10.36 to $ 12.94# A 10 percent investment credit reduces these 
values to a range of $9.11-$11.12, The analysis also shows that an 8
Ta
bl
e 
6—
An
nu
al
iz
ed
 p
re
se
nt
 v
al
ue
 o
f 
pr
et
ax
 n
et
 
in
co
me
 r
eq
ui
re
d 
to
 b
re
ak
 e
ve
n 
on
 a
 $
10
0 
de
pr
ec
ia
bl
e 
la
nd
 i
mp
ro
ve
me
nt
 b
y 
ta
x 
op
ti
on
^
19
O CU 4J « H ja
pi (U ft) P O o o o o o o o o o o o o oo CO *H CU O o o o o o o o o o o o o o
■H a O CO • • ft • • • » • • ft • • • •
P cu CU CO o o o o o o o o o o o o o oU & p (fl H^ •H tH i-H i-H i-H ' i-H iH I -H ^H rH i-H i-Ha) X tx h  a) <u 
H  X J
PI
0> P -cf r-~ Hfl- o r - . ■H CO NO O r-- CO m 0 0B *H CO CO m m r - 00 ON CM ■o 1 ". ON CM c n
S^ S P  x l * • ft * • a ft • ft • * • •
p i 00 CO cu ON ON ON O n ON ON ON ON O o o o ^H iH
o 0) P ^H rH rH t*H *-H i-H
*H >  0
P c
Cfl •H
*H
O
CUP P
PU PI
CU a) p no o h> m CM O ■vf ON r- . o o \D m
TO 6^ 6  *H rH CM CM cn -Cf NO r^. 0 0 rH m 00 O m
O P  x • « ft • ft ft * * • * ft • •
<U i—i CO cu Or ON ON ON ON ON ON O' o o o i-H i—H i-H
Pi a) p i-H i-H iH rH i-H i-H•rl > orH pi•H
P CO
pPI PW) Cfl*H P rH
Cfl P! r-lPi aj p O O CM CM H CM 00 NO o ON m '•O CN inP B *H Q -fl- m NO r-» ON o CM \o ON cn \0 rH CNCO o P  X * ft « ft * » ft • ft ft « ft ft •IS CO cu o o o o o o i-H i-H i-H i-H CM <N cn cna) p > o i-H i-H i-H H H rH rH H rH i-H T—1 rH 1-Hpi•H
pi o P0) B •H rH cn ON -3- o CM cn n On rH o 00 NOp p X) cn cn cn 'fl- n NO r-» 00 o CM in r- ON oCO 00 CO CU ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft>N cy p ON ON ON ON On ON ON ON o O o o o iHCO > CJ H H i-H rH rH Hd■r-l
a)
>o po dCU cy pp &NS B H rH o r-- hJ- ON CM in o ON NO ON cno p i-H *-H CM CM cn 'cr NO r». o CM n 1". rH CMp H cn <u ft # ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ftCO <u p ON ON ON ON On ON On ON o o o o H Ho > o H H iH iH t—1o pi
X<UpCfl Pp 0CU d p NO o 00 NO n cn 00 n o cn i-H CMrH B ■H cn -cr m NO 00 On |—t sr OO H "t 00 ONcu o p Xa IS to CU o o o o o o O H rH i-H CM CM CM CMa CU P i-H H H i-H rH H i-H H rH rH rH H iH tH
<1 > O
PI-H
i—I cu pf l U C  
6 cfl CD
*H P  O
b0 P  
P  ><! CUCfl Cfl (O,
JEJ +J w
cm no oo cm mH^ tH i—| i—H N^J CN] oo cn oo cm m  on Om  te ce sf st- 4  in
Tw
en
ty
-y
ea
r 
ho
ld
in
g 
pe
ri
od
, 
10
 p
er
ce
nt
 d
is
co
un
t 
ra
te
, 
10
0 
pe
rc
en
t 
sa
lv
ag
e 
va
lu
e
20
percent investment credit is inferior to a 10 percent investment 
credit in most cases; recall that investors who take a 10 percent 
credit receive a 5 percent penalty on cost recovery and must add 50 
percent of the credit to the basis for calculating gain income when 
the asset is liquidated. As expected, alternate straight-line depre­
ciation is inferior to ACRS because the depreciation allowance is 
released at a slower rate and over a longer time frame due to a half- 
year convention on depreciation.
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the results obtained for 
depreciable land improvements is that many of the provisions now 
embedded in the Code take on very little economic significance. The 
law's provisions for selecting an 8 or 10 percent investment tax 
credit result in only trivial differences in the economic feasibility 
of a land-related investment. Similarly, the five-year depreciation 
alternate to ACRS appears to be of little importance from an economic 
perspective.
Comparisons of Tax Rules
Under the assumptions used in this analysis, one cannot neces­
sarily conclude that the conservation deduction advantages a conserva­
tion expenditure relative to a depreciable expenditure. In the 
absence of cost sharing, a depreciable improvement under ACRS and a 10 
percent investment credit is superior to the conservation deduction 
for investors with marginal tax rates below 25 percent (figure 1). 
Other things being equal, relatively more net income is required to 
justify a conservation outlay for investors in these lower tax 
brackets. This is due to the availability of an investment tax credit 
on the depreciable improvement in the sense that ACRS alone generates 
less tax savings than the conservation deduction.
It should be noted that the Code’s provisions for cost recovery 
probably help set the stage for converting ordinary income to capital 
gain. Reca11 that any gain to the extent of cost recovery, either via 
ACRS or alternate straight-line depreciation, is ordinary income at 
liquidation. However, allocating the value of real estate to land and 
land improvements is an inherently arbitrary exercise. The investor 
who is adroit in tax management should be in a position to argue, for 
tax purposes, that the improvement has a zero salvage value. In 
effect, this tactic shifts any salvage value of the improvement to the 
land asset and increases the basis for calculating capital gain. Gain 
on land receives a tax preference. Doing so, under the assumptions 
used in this analysis, further advantages an expenditure on a depre­
ciable improvement compared to a conservation outlay (see "ACRS/IC 
Convert" in figure 1). Investors who might use this tactic would find 
the depreciable improvement superior to a conservation improvement 
unless their marginal tax rate exceeds 33 percent.
To put this result in some perspective, married taxpayers filing 
jointly with a spouse must have taxable income (gross income less
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adjustments, deductions and exemptions) above $35,000 to incur mar­
ginal rates above 30 percent. About 12 percent of all returns filed 
by sole proprietors with farm income (or loss) had adjusted gross in­
comes above $50,000 in 1979 (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 1982). 
Since exemptions and deductions are subtracted from income when com­
puting one's taxable income, adjusted incomes in this range are proba­
bly needed to make a conservation improvement preferable to a depre­
ciable improvement. Thus, for the overriding majority of all farmland 
owners, tax rules applicable to depreciable land improvements are more 
liberal than those available for a conservation project which involves 
an enduring improvement to land*
The results reflect assumptions about the investor's planning 
horizon (20 years), discount rate (10 percent) and expected salvage 
value of the improvement (100 percent). Alterations in these assump­
tions produce a different result. For example, reduction in planning 
horizon for an investor with a 25 percent marginal tax rate has little 
impact on the relative portions of annual income streams required to 
justify investing in a land improvement (figure 2). Namely, the 
depreciable improvement maintains its superiority until the marginal 
tax rate ranges in the vicinity of 30 percent. Regardless of planning 
horizon, only those investors with the highest marginal tax rates will 
find the conservation deduction attractive when compared to improve­
ments eligible for accelerated cost recovery and investment tax 
credits.
A lower discount rate, other things equal, reduces the present 
value of income needed for project feasibility— see figure 3 .  The 
impact of a reduced discount rate on the relative position of the 
conservation deduction via the treatment afforded a depreciable 
improvement turns on assumptions made about capital gain. If the 
improvement is expected to maintain its value over the planning 
horizon and the investor converts this value to gain income, then the 
depreciable improvement is superior at all marginal tax rates. This 
stems from the tax preferences on gain income and the low discount 
penalty on its receipt. In fact, high income investors can realize 
net operating losses over a short holding period if they successfully 
allocate the improvement's value to the land at liquidation.
Considering the polar, and somewhat unlikely, case where the 
expected salvage value of an improvement is zero produces even more 
noticeable similarities between the conservation deduction and ACRS/ 
investment tax credits. With a marginal tax rate of 25 percent and a 
planning horizon of 20 years, break-even incomes for the deduction and 
ACRS/investment tax credit are quite similar (figure 4). This occurs 
because liquidation with no capital gain eliminates the tax preference 
on gain income. These preferences generate higher benefits for high 
income investors than for low income investors. But once again, mar­
ginal tax rates in the vicinity of 30 percent are needed to make the 
conservation deduction more attractive than ACRS/investment tax 
credits.
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Policy Implications
For more than thirty years, the Congress has sought to promote 
soil and water conservation improvements on U.S. cropland with Sec#
175 of the Internal Revenue Code# Sec, 175 allows the farm taxpayer 
to deduct rather than capitalize a conservation-related improvement to 
land# This study investigated two issues that bear directly upon the 
efficacy of such policies in relation to efforts to curb soil erosion 
on U.S. cropland:
8 What is the role of land improvements in erosion control?
8 Does a conservation deduction give tax advantages to invest­
ments in conservation-related land improvements, compared to 
depreciable land improvements?
The findings are that land improvements have something to do with 
erosion control— but not much# Similarly, the calculations devised in 
this study show that deduction can tilt decisions to improve land 
toward soil-conserving expenditures in some cases# However, the 
liberal tax treatment now accorded depreciable capital improvements to 
land has greatly diminished the attractiveness of the conservation 
deduction for broad classes of taxpayers# Taken together, these 
results support the argument that the public interest in reduced soil 
erosion is not always well served by Sec# 175 of the IRS Code#
The scope of the conservation expensing provision is far too 
narrow when applied in the context of soil erosion. Only erosion con­
trol practices involving windbreaks, diversions, terraces, and grassed 
waterways fall within the purview of Sec. 175. These practices are 
important elements in erosion control programs, but they are used on 
less than 10 percent of U.S# cropland. For these reasons, one can 
argue that Sec# 175 is largely outside the mainstream of current 
efforts to curb soil erosion on the Nation* s cropland. Indeed, the 
provision allows deductions for a variety of land improvements— such 
as drainage and supplemental irrigation— which are precursors to more 
intensive cropping and, hence, more soil-losing uses of the American 
cropland base#
Even if soil erosion control measures are involved, computations 
developed for this study indicate that Sec# 175 does not necessarily 
tilt investment incentives toward conservation improvement. The 
deduction produces an immediate reduction in taxable income, but 
alternative expenditures which are depreciable under current law are 
eligible for an investment tax credit and cost recovery in only five 
years. Such liberal treatment of depreciable capital items, according 
to the results of this study, means that deducting a conservation 
improvement is not advantageous relative to a depreciable improvement 
unless one's marginal tax rate is greater than 30 percent. Only a 
small fraction of farm taxpayers have taxable incomes which are large 
enough to place them in the 30 percent tax bracket.
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These findings help focus current discussions dealing with 
Federal tax reform* A recent proposal by the Reagan Administration 
would repeal Sec. 175 and require any qualifying conservation expendi­
tures to be treated as a nondepreciable capital item* As shown in 
this study, this initiative would increase the pretax income required 
to make the investment economically feasible. However, repeal of 
Sec. 175 would not necessarily detract from efforts to ameliorate soil 
erosion problems on American farmland for two principal reasons.
First, a farm taxpayer disposed toward controlling soil erosion 
often has the option to choose between nondepreciable and depreciable 
conservation investments. Current provisions for investment tax 
credits and rapid cost recovery appear to provide tax incentives which 
advantage depreciable investments, compared with nondepreciable ones. 
This relationship may well be reflected in current erosion control 
efforts. A principal development in recent years has teen very large 
increases in the use of conservation tillage (Magleby, Gadsby, 
Colacicco and Thigpen). The adoption of reduced tillage techniques, 
among other things, involves the use of new tillage implements.
Tillage implements are advantaged under current law because they are 
treated as depreciable capital items. President Reagan's tax reform 
plan, however, would eliminate the investment tax credit, lengthen the 
tax write-off period for depreciable items, and index depreciation 
deductions for inflation. The net effect would be a small increase in 
the after-tax cost of depreciable capital items, whether improvements 
to land or investments in new farm machinery (U.S. Department of Agri­
culture, 1985).
Finally, the available evidence today suggests that publicly 
sponsored conservation efforts must be more closely targeted to land 
resources most in need of erosion control measures. Sec. 175, on the 
other hand, is an exceedingly blunt policy instrument. There is no 
explicit targeting under the expensing provision under current law 
except to the extent that it might be used in conjunction with public 
cost sharing programs which might be directed toward farmland with 
substantial soil loss problems.
The efficacy of the conservation expense deduction as a tool to 
direct erosion control effort toward land most in need of treatment is 
constrained in several ways. A farm investor must have taxable income 
to derive a benefit from the deduction. It has also been shown that 
the economic attractiveness of conservation deductions increases with 
increases in taxable income. The available data on elections to 
deduct conservation expenditures support this relationship; in addi­
tion, elections to expense the cost of a conservation project tend to 
be associated with investments on larger farms (Anderson and Bills). 
However, the available empirical evidence does not suggest that the 
Nation's more pressing soil loss problems are strongly correlated with 
farm size or net farm income. For example, recent analysis has shown 
that there is no convincing relationship between farm size and crop­
land erosion potential or annual soil loss from erosion; similarly, 
there is little empirical support for an association between net farm
28
income and the presence of a soil erosion problem (Bills and 
Heimlich). Precision in targeting tax-related investments in soil and 
water conservation is lacking because the underlying physical and 
economic relationships to make it work do not exist.
As long as erosion problems persist on U.S. farmland, policy­
makers will undoubtedly give attention to remedies which involve the 
Federal income tax. The public interest is best served with initia­
tives which direct tax-induced conservation effort toward the applica­
tion of cost-effective practices on land most vulnerable to soil 
erosion. The explicit tax treatment now afforded conservation proj­
ects under Sec. 175 does not necessarily accomplish these social 
objectives.
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